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idealism be true, part at least of this assumption is a proved illusion; the only environment in relation to which we can be either active or passive will be a "social" environment of minds. Further, if the real world of minds should prove to be an anarchic realm of independent and conflicting purposes, both activity and passivity would no doubt be ultimate characteristics of it. But if, on the other hand, it is an orderly system manifesting the guidance of a single intelligence, as Prof. Ward seems to believe, then there are really *no* conflicting purposes and no real failures. In fact, there is no environment for an ultimate and universal mind to act against, and thus, if "God" is really all and mechanism nothing, "God" can be neither active nor passive. But, if the "consciousness of activity" can only arise from an illusory belief in an antagonism that does not really exist, is not activity after all, what Mr. Bradley calls it, "appearance" and not reality? This difficulty is at any rate not to be met by the remark that "those who have such compunction about admitting mental activity, regard mental passivity as transparent fact; and yet a very little reflexion might convince them that passivity involves activity". There may be persons so thoughtless as to make this fatal admission, but it is not against such criticism as theirs that the category of activity stands in need of defence. The question is not whether mind is ultimately active or ultimately passive, but whether "activity," in the sense in which we want it as a working concept in psychology, the sense in which we speak of being sometimes more, sometimes less, active, can be predicated of any ultimate reality without self-contradiction. But this is precisely one of those questions which idealists of the Leibnitz-Lotze type and those of us who have learned in another school have still to debate between ourselves.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The World and the Individual. First Series. "The Four Historical Conceptions of Being." By Josiah Royce, Ph.D., Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University (Aberdeen Gifford Lectures). New York: Macmillan, 1900. Pp. xiv., 588.

DR. ROYCE has given us a treatise of the greatest value and interest. His lectures form one of the most thoughtful and original presentations of an Idealistic Philosophy that have appeared since the tide of opinion began to flow again towards Idealism. His system may be considered as based on Hegel, and as profoundly influenced by Mr. Bradley, but there is much in it which is distinctively his own, and which cannot fail to profit an attentive reader.

Dr. Royce has the courage of his great master. "The central problem of our discussion," he announces in the first lecture, "will

be the question: What is reality?" (p. 6). "Philosophy," he remarks, not only in Hegel's spirit, but very much in his manner, "necessarily involves a good deal of courage; but so does life in general" (p. 7). "As for the fine-drawn distinctions and airy abstractions, no distinction is ever too subtle for you, at the moment when it occurs to you to make that distinction for yourself, and not merely to hear that somebody else has made it. And no abstraction seems to you too airy in the hour when you rise upon your own wings to the region where just that abstraction happens to be an element in the concrete fulness of your intellectual life" (p. 8). With these words we get the key-note of the book.

"I am one of those," the author proceeds "who hold that when you ask the question: What is an Idea? and: How can Ideas stand in any true relation to Reality? you attack the world-knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes" (p. 16). Now ideas have two aspects. "An idea is any state of mind or complex of states, that, when present, is consciously viewed as the relatively completed embodiment, and therefore already as the partial fulfilment of a purpose" (p. 24). This purpose Dr. Royce calls the Internal Meaning of the Idea. But ideas "at least appear to have that other sort of meaning, that reference beyond themselves to objects, that cognitive relation to outer facts, that attempted correspondence with outer facts, which many accounts of our ideas regard as their primary, inexplicable, and ultimate character. I call this second, and, for me, still problematic and derived aspect of the nature of ideas, their apparently External Meaning" (p. 26).

The problem of the nature of Being will then take this form, "How is the internal meaning of ideas consistent with their apparently external meaning?" The solution of this may be found, we are told, "in the consideration that unless ideas first voluntarily bind themselves to a given task, and so, by their internal purpose, already commit themselves to a certain selection of its object, they are neither true nor false, . . . that despite the seemingly hopeless contrast between internal and external meaning, ideas really possess truth or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of their own task as ideas" (p. 32).

In the second lecture, we are told that there are four fundamental conceptions of Reality. The first is the Realist conception. For it, "that is real which is simply *Independent* of the mere ideas that relate or that may relate to it". "For the second" or Mystical "conception, that is-real which is absolutely and finally *Immediate*, so that when it is found, *i.e.*, felt, it altogether ends any effort at ideal definition, and in this sense *satisfies* ideas as well as constitutes the fact." The third is the typical view of modern Critical Rationalism, for which "that is real which is purely and simply Valid or True." "But for the fourth conception, that is real which finally presents in a completed experience the whole

meaning of a System of Ideas." This is called the Synthetic conception (p. 61).

The remainder of the second lecture is taken up with an exposition of Realism and Mysticism which is admirable both as metaphysics and as literature. The contrast, as Dr. Royce draws it, is decidedly to the disadvantage of Realism, which, we are told, "has never been held wholly clear and apart from other conceptions of reality by any first-rate thinker" (p. 70). Space permits only of one quotation, "The realist loves to talk of 'wholesome' belief in reality and to hurl pathological epithets at opponents. It is thus often amusing to find the same thinker who declares that reality is quite independent of all merely human or mental interests, in the next breath offering as proof of his thesis the practical and interesting 'wholesomeness' of this very conviction" (p. 75).

Mysticism gets much more favourable treatment. Its essence is defined as follows: "The true historical importance of Mysticism lies not in the subject to which it applied the predicate real, but in the view it holds of the fundamental nature of that very ontological predicate itself. No matter what subject the mystic seems to call real. That might be from your point of view any subject you please; yourself, or God, or the wall. The interest of Mysticism lies wholly in the predicate. Mysticism consists in asserting that to be means, simply and wholly, to be *immediate*, as what we call pure colour, pure sound, pure emotion, are already in us partly and imperfectly immediate. . . . That . . . the mystic is a very abstract sort of person, I will admit. But he is usually a keen thinker. Only he uses his thinking sceptically, to make naught of other thinkers. He gets his reality not by thinking, but by consulting the data of experience. He is not stupid. And he is trying very skilfully to be a pure empiricist. Indeed, I should maintain that the mystics are the only thorough-going empiricists in the history of philosophy" (pp. 80, 81).

In the third lecture Dr. Royce discusses Realism, and rejects it on grounds not substantially different from those which have been put forward by other idealists. In the fourth lecture Mysticism is further discussed. The example selected for illustration of the principle is the Mysticism of the Upanisheds. Dr. Royce also quotes Browning's "Last Ride Together," in which he finds an "ontology in essence one with" that of the mediæval and Hindoo mystics. This seems scarcely fair. Browning's ideal here, as elsewhere, is no doubt something that transcends finite experience. In this respect he is a mystic, in the company of Hegel, and also, I imagine, of Dr. Royce. But his ideal is never in a merely negative relation to the finite.

And it is in this merely negative relation to the finite that Dr. Royce finds the fatal defect of the Mysticism which he discusses here. Both Realism and Mysticism he says "define in the end nothing whatever. Only the realist does not intend this result, while the mystic often seems to glory in it. He thus glories, as

we have seen, because in fact he is defining a very fascinating and a highly conscious contrast-effect—a contrast-effect that, far from being itself anything absolute, or actually unknown and ineffable, is a constantly present character of our human type of finite consciousness. As a fact, our thinking is a search for a goal that is conceived at once as rationally satisfying and as theoretically true. And this goal we conceive as real precisely in so far as we consciously pursue it, and mean something by the pursuit. But now this goal, since it is not present to us, in our finite form of consciousness, is first conceived by contrast with the process of this pursuit. So far indeed we conceive it negatively” (p. 180). . . . “But when the mystic, defining his goal wholly in negative terms, lays stress upon the contrast as simply absolute, he finds that so far his Absolute is defined as nothing but the absence of finitude, and so as apparently equivalent to nothing at all, since all definite contents are for us so far finite, and since the absence of finitude is for us the absence of contents” (p. 181).

Mysticism then must be amended by a recognition that our finite life is no more mere illusion than it is absolute reality. It is too unreal to do more than lead us to something beyond itself, but if it can do even this, it cannot be absolutely unreal.

The fifth lecture gives us the transition to the Third Conception of Reality. If Realism, while giving up the hopeless task of defining the Real as absolutely independent of knowledge, wishes still to emphasise the fact that it is outside my particular knowledge, and that my ideas must conform to it, it is led to the view that the Real is that “which, if known, is found giving to ideas their validity, that to which ideas ought to correspond” (p. 201). And, again, the mystic only reached his conception of the Absolute by setting aside our finite experiences as contradictory, and not conforming to the ideal of knowledge. It would seem to follow then that true Being resides in the Validity of Ideas.

The next lecture begins by tracing the conception of Being as Validity in the philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas and Kant. The question then arises: “What is a valid or a determinately possible experience at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible? What is a valid truth at the moment when no one verifies its validity?” (p. 260). Actual experience is always individual. But *merely* valid truths appear as mere universals. Can this Third Conception recognise and accept this difference?

The seventh lecture considers “the Internal and External meaning of Ideas,” and in it Dr. Royce’s own views begin to come to the front. To begin with, he takes the definition of Truth as “that about which we judge”. All judgments, he holds, assert something about a real world. The assertion of hypothetical judgments is a negative one. “In general, the judgment, ‘If A is B, C is D,’ can be interpreted as meaning that there are, in the world of valid objects, no real cases where, at once, A is B, while at the same time C is nevertheless not D”

(p. 274). It follows from this that universal judgments can never fully attain the end with which they set out. Taken by themselves, they can only tell us "what external Reality is not". Now what we want to know is what external Reality *is*. But our negative judgments could only give us this if they exhausted all possible alternatives. And this is a task which is "not only endless, but hopeless" (p. 279).

In particular judgments, indeed, we get positive assertions about Reality. But then no particular judgments will ever enable us to determine an individual as individual. We can never, by means of them, know an object so that we can know it to be absolutely unique in the universe. That is, we cannot determine it completely. But "the Other that we seek is that which, if found, would *determine our ideas to their final truth*. Now only what is finally determinate can, in its turn, determine. . . . Whoever should try, as, in fact, our Third Conception of Being seems to try, to define the world of Being in terms exclusive of individuality, seems forced to say, 'The final fact is that there is no individual fact, or, in other words, that there is no unique Being at all, but only a type; so that the Being with which our thoughts are to correspond does not determine the "mere ideas" to any single and unique correspondence with itself, but leaves them finally indeterminate'. But is the *Veritas* that is thus left us any *Veritas* at all? Is not the very expression used self-contradictory? Can the absence of finality be the only final fact?" (pp. 295, 296).

The point raised in the questions with which this extract concludes would have repaid, I venture to suggest, further treatment. It has been held, by thinkers who cannot lightly be passed over, that universal and particular judgments, in all their relative indefiniteness, are, nevertheless, the ultimate truth. A refutation of this view seems necessary, if Dr. Royce's position is to be maintained—and no one is better qualified than Dr. Royce to give one.

We now pass to consider Truth as the Correspondence between any Idea and its Object. This correspondence, as the author points out with admirable clearness, depends on the purpose which we entertain in using the idea. "The idea is true if it possesses the sort of correspondence to its object that the idea itself wants to possess. Unless that kind of identity in inner structure between idea and object can be found which the specific purpose embodied in a given idea demands the idea is false" (p. 306). Again "the idea intends to attain this correspondence to some particular object—not to any object you please, not to whatever happens to correspond to the ideal construction in question, but to a determined object. The determination of what object is meant, is, therefore, certainly again due, in one aspect, to the internal meaning of the idea. No one else can determine for me what object I mean by my idea.

“But hereupon we seem to face, indeed, a fatal difficulty. . . . And this is that, if the idea predetermines what object it selects as the one that it means, just as it predetermines what sort of correspondence it intends to have to this object, the idea, nevertheless, does not predetermine whether its object is such that the idea, if finite, shall succeed in attaining entire agreement with the object. Otherwise truth would be mere tautology, error would be excluded in advance, and it would be useless even to talk of an object external in any sense as the idea” (pp. 319, 320).

What is the solution? Dr. Royce gives the following, which is in harmony with the result attained from the first definition. “The idea so selects the object, that, if the idea has a perfectly definite meaning and truth at all, this object is to be a precisely determinate object, *such that no other object could take its place as the object of this idea*. And in spite of the fact that the object is such solely by the will of the idea, the idea undertakes submissively to be either true or false when compared with that object” (p. 327). But with this we have reached the fourth and final Conception of Being, “that What is, or what is real, is as such the complete embodiment, in individual form and in final fulfilment, of the internal meaning of finite ideas” (p. 339).

This Fourth Conception is then developed, and defended against various misconceptions. After this, in the ninth lecture, we pass to the discussion of Universality and Unity. This begins, if I understand it rightly, with an attempt to identify the ultimately true and the ultimately desirable, which does not seem to follow logically from what has preceded it. In every case in which our ideas are not expressed, we are told, “the reality, which shall positively refuse its expression, is *ipso facto* the reality to which the idea itself appeals, and is not independent of this appeal. For you are not put in the wrong by a reality to which you have made no reference; and error is possible only concerning objects that we actually mean as our own objects. The object that is to defeat my partial and fragmentary will is then *ipso facto* my whole will, my final purpose, my total meaning determinately and definitely expressed” (p. 389). And again, “My will, as it is now transiently embodied, can fail in any partial way of realisation, but only because I now fail to be wholly aware *of* my own will. . . . However far I wander in the wildernesses of my temporal experience, the eternal fulfilment of my own life encompasses me. I escape not from the meshes of the net of my own will” (p. 390).

This seems too short a road to a final harmony. No doubt every act of knowledge is a fulfilment of the will, for we cannot know, as Dr. Royce points out, without willing to know. And every volition is an experience of reality, for, when we will, our volition is part of the real. Thus nothing real could be absolutely alien to our will, and no ideal could be absolutely void of reality. But, after all, the will to know is only an element in the whole system of volition. And it is conceivable that this element

might be satisfied without the others. We might know the universe, *e.g.*, and know it to refuse satisfaction to our demands for beauty, or for love. In that case it would give us something we had willed—namely, knowledge—but not everything, nor, perhaps, what we regarded as highest. In such a case as this “the eternal fulfilment of my own life” would not be realised.

Such a contingency could be disproved by a system which worked out in comparative detail the ultimate nature of the real and of the good, and which would then show, of these independently attained results, that in fact they coincided. I do not mean to assert that the identity, if attained, would be a mere brute conjunction. On the contrary, it would doubtless be a supreme unity compared to which both reality and goodness would be mere abstractions. But it remains true that the good and the real can only be united through a third term. It is impossible to prove that the ultimately real is *as such* the ultimately good, or that the ultimately good is *as such* the ultimately real.

Dr. Royce now passes on to the personality of the Absolute. “In the world as we define it, there can exist no fact except as a known fact, as a fact present in some consciousness, namely, precisely to the consciousness that fulfils the whole meaning of whoever asserts that this fact is real. In view of this essential feature of our finite situation as thinkers, it follows at once that the whole world of truth and being must exist only as present, in all its variety, its wealth, its relationships, its entire constitution, to the unity of a single consciousness, which includes both our own and all finite conscious meanings in one final eternally present insight” (p. 397).

It may, perhaps, be granted that we cannot conceive reality except as conscious experience, and that there is much which we call real of which it is in the highest degree improbable that any finite being is at present conscious. It is by no means as certain, however, that there is anything which we should at present call real of which no finite being ever was or ever will be conscious. Of course a consciousness which has been or will be is, so far, a consciousness which now is not. And if the existence of finite selves was merely temporal, we should have to postulate the infinite consciousness which is perpetually conscious of all reality. But Dr. Royce would not, I suppose, deny that a finite self had an eternal significance. And surely this leaves another alternative open—that we call Being real of which no finite self is at present conscious because we find in its future or past consciousness of it *sub specie temporis*, the sign of a timeless consciousness of it *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Of the rest of the lecture it is only possible to mention in passing the well-balanced exposition which is given of the extent to which we are justified in interpreting the universe in terms of our own consciousness. Dr. Royce steers a middle course between Mr.

Bradley on the one hand, and Hegel's practice on the other. (Hegel's theory might not impossibly be found in the middle with Dr. Royce.) The result—not to be either limited to humanity nor alien to it—is brought out with great clearness.

The last lecture is entitled *Individuality and Freedom*. That Individuality does not suffer in such a system is plain. The whole aim of knowledge, it tells us, is to find the individual. And the close unity of the whole, so far from destroying the individuality of the parts, is essential to it. With regard to freedom, the author points out that causal determination can never be the last word about anything individual. "When we have assumed, as we have now done, that every moment of every finite consciousness has some unique character, and when we have asserted, as we have also done, that in our rational life our momentary will and its finite expression belong to this very unique aspect of our finite life, we have indeed found, in our finite will, an aspect which *no* causation could even by any possibility explain. For whatever else causality may be, it implies the explanation of facts by their general character, and by their connexion with other facts. Whatever is unique, is as such not causally explicable. The individual as such is never the mere result of law. In consequence, the causal explanation of an object never defines the individual and unique characters as such, but always its general characters. Consequently, *if* the will and the expression of that will in any moment of our finite life possess characters, namely, precisely those individual and uniquely significant characters which no causal explanation can predetermine, then such acts of will, as significant expressions of purpose in our life, constitute precisely what ethical common sense has always meant by free acts" (p. 467). This view is one of great importance. It may be doubted whether "ethical common sense" would accept a life as free which was "a stage or case of the expression of the divine purpose at a given point of time" (p. 464). But then it might also be doubted if it has a coherent conception of freedom at all.

The lectures are followed by a Supplementary Essay on *The One, The Many, and the Infinite*, which is mainly a criticism of Mr. Bradley. Dr. Royce admits that Mr. Bradley "has shown that every effort to bring to unity the manifoldness of our world involves us in what he himself often calls an 'infinite process'" (p. 474). But does this involve that all our efforts must be considered to have failed, and that the way in which the manifold is really unified is, for us, a mystery? Is a real infinite process an impossibility?

At any rate, we come across such processes in mathematics, where they "lie at the basis of highly and very positively significant researches" (p. 499). And, outside the reach of mathematics, there are important cases where "a single purpose, definable as One, demands for its realisation a multitude of particulars which could not be a limited multitude without involving the direct defeat

of the purpose itself" (p. 501). For example if, on part of the surface of England, an absolutely accurate map of England was constructed, such a map would contain a map of itself, since it *is* part of the surface of England, and it represents all of the surface of England, itself included. But this second map would also have to contain a map of itself, and so on in an infinite series (p. 505). Now, whether we believe such a map to be possible, or whether we follow Mr. Bradley in rejecting it as impossible, "our faith, or a doubt, would equally involve seeing that the *one* plan of mapping in question necessarily implies just this infinite *variety* of internal constitution. We should, moreover, see how and why the one and the infinitely many are here, at least within thought's reach, conceptually linked" (p. 507).

Now such a system, says Dr. Royce, quoting Dedekind, is found in my own realm of thoughts (p. 511). For whenever I have a thought, I can also think that I have it. And then I can also think that I have this second reflective thought, and so on without end. And any theory which holds the Absolute to be self-representative involves such an infinite series. For the representation falls within the Absolute, and must be represented. And so must this second representation, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The Essay ends with a consideration of the arguments for holding that such an infinite series could not be real. It is maintained that an infinite series which is involved in the unity of a single purpose, can be a true individual, and may therefore be real.

It would be impossible within the limits of a review to adequately criticise this theory, or to raise a further question—on which the practical importance of the theory depends. Granted that the Absolute is a harmony, is it ultimately a harmony of self-representation, or is there some more adequate form? Something would have to be said on this point, but here I must content myself with closing my account of a most valuable and interesting book.

The second series of lectures is promised within a year. It is to contain the more detailed application of the results here reached to problems that directly concern religion.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.